“Modi and Xi will become friends,” The Economist magazine announced after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Kazan. The paper later announced that the Sino-Indian border standoff had been “resolved” following an agreement on disarmament and patrolling.
These developments are worth noting, but don’t read too much into them. Significantly, this agreement, if implemented, has the potential to ease tensions between China and India stemming from the 2020 border crisis. However, current and former Indian officials are wary, including that they are being “lulled into a false sense of security.”
The first meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Mr Xi in five years signals a tactical thaw rather than a strategic shift away from the conflict between China and India. Steps remain to be taken to resolve the 2020 border dispute, and the two countries have some serious differences beyond the broader border dispute. So think of this more like Washington’s efforts to stabilize or solidify US-China relations than the beginning of a beautiful friendship between New Delhi and Beijing. For India, China will continue to be a pacing challenge.
context
It has been clear for months that China and India were working towards an agreement. Military and diplomatic officials have been meeting for the past four years to discuss the border standoff. But New Delhi recently appears to have sensed an opportunity, as Beijing faces strategic and economic pressures and uncertainty about the U.S. presidential election (or attempts to take advantage of it).
India also has reasons to try to ease the situation. These include preventing new border escalations; Recognition that India needs time to build its capabilities and partnerships. The need to address the negative effects of the global crisis. Uncertainty regarding the next U.S. president’s approach to China. Concerns that partner countries’ lobbying of the Chinese government could make India vulnerable. Perhaps there is a desire to create some influence over those partners. and calls for India’s selective economic re-engagement with China (including some American companies).
What we know about this agreement
Although the details are not yet clear, we do know that the agreement heralds a return to dialogue. Besides the meeting between Modi and Xi Jinping, countries also announced the resumption of suspended talks, including special representative meetings and regular exchanges of foreign ministers.
Indian authorities have confirmed that the first part of the resolution of the 2020 border standoff, namely the disengagement, has been completed and that several friction points (around Depsang and Demchok in the western region, and around the Yangtze River, the site of skirmishes in 2022) have been completed. announced that a new patrol system has been completed. — in the eastern sector).
However, this is not a return to the previous status quo. Questions remain about how the new patrolling and grazing conditions compare to those that existed previously, and whether new buffer zones created at other friction points will persist. In addition, two additional steps have not been taken: de-escalation and de-direction of forward-deployed forces.
Also, the agreement does not mean the normalization of Sino-Indian relations, as some observers have claimed. India’s foreign minister said this would pave the way for more normal relations, but stressed that it depended on whether both sides actually followed that path.
Given India’s sense that in 2020 China violated previous bilateral agreements on changing the status quo on its borders, there is little, if any, confidence that China will follow that path. India will therefore closely monitor China’s implementation of the agreement and seek to ascertain whether China is honoring its commitments. Further steps by India on border negotiations and other issues may be linked to Beijing’s actions.
If progress is made, there are several areas where India could review the restrictions it has placed on cooperation with China. Some possibilities: resumption of various suspended dialogues (diplomatic, military, economic), resumption of direct flights, increased interaction with civil society, increased issuance of visas (including for journalists), multilateral Concrete cooperation on issues (e.g. global economic governance reform). , and selective economic re-engagement.
There is no consensus among Indian companies on the desirability or extent of economic relations with China. However, if progress is made on the border and negotiations, India will be able to improve regulations in less sensitive areas and in areas where cooperation is expected to be beneficial in the short term for India’s labor, manufacturing and exports overall. may be alleviated. It is unlikely that restrictions will be lifted completely. Streamline vetting or case-by-case approval processes.
The Indian government has already granted several visa and import approvals for companies from India or friendly foreign countries, deeming it necessary to make India part of global supply chains and create jobs. In certain areas, India could condition Chinese investment on joint ventures with local companies.
Different readout, different atmosphere
Most Indian officials appear to be under no illusions that the road ahead will be easy. The deep rift between China and India is already evident in how the two countries have communicated these agreements.
The leaders of India and China said they reached an agreement on border issues and agreed to strengthen strategic communication.
But the similarities ended there. India stressed on “prioritizing borders before broader relations” and strengthened peace and tranquility on its borders as a precondition for broader relations. Meanwhile, China maintained a “broader focus on the frontier” and stressed that “specific differences” should not derail the broader relationship.
Furthermore, China indicated that India had agreed to return to economic cooperation to enable development, but India took a more non-committal stance, saying it was open to exploring it. More broadly, China’s reading also suggests that Mr Modi is interested in proposing ways to deepen ties, and that Mr Xi would agree “in principle” to consider it. Ta.
It was also striking to see how different countries have different visions of their global and regional roles. India noted that while the two leaders confirmed that stable and friendly relations “contribute to a multipolar Asia and a multipolar world,” China’s statement only referred to its aspirations for a multipolar world. This will only heighten India’s concerns that Beijing aims to unipolarize Asia. India, on the other hand, did not share or support President Xi’s declaration that China is “a member of the Global South.”
The gap between India’s worldview and that of China (and Russia) was also evident in Prime Minister Modi’s remarks at the BRICS summit. He warned against the group being seen as divisive (i.e. anti-Western) and seeking to overturn the international order. His words also conveyed concerns that the expansion of BRICS, encouraged by Beijing and Russia, would weaken India’s role and influence.
Important step, but not a strategic reset
These differences reveal, among other things, that New Delhi and Beijing are not on the same page. Moreover, absent a major change in China’s intentions and actions, the deal does not signal a strategic shift for India away from competition with China.
For one thing, borders have changed forever. Given the build-up of troops, equipment, and infrastructure on both sides of the China-India border since 2020, de-escalation and de-escalation will be difficult, if not impossible. India also does not trust China and wants to remain prepared in case the People’s Liberation Army confronts China. The military takes action again. A former Indian ambassador to China has already warned that if Beijing reneges on its commitments, it will be harder for India (than for China) to reintroduce troops to that part of the border.
Beyond the ongoing border dispute, there are several bilateral, regional, and global differences between India and China, and China’s assertiveness on none of these fronts has yet eased. .
New Delhi will therefore continue to strive to strengthen resilience and deterrence even as it resumes dialogue with China. It is likely to maintain a risk-averse approach and limit exposure to China in critical infrastructure, technology and communications sectors. We will continue to strengthen India’s overall capabilities and capabilities, but we will need to be wary of voices from certain quarters that say there is less urgency. We will continue to deepen our partnership to adjust the balance, including with the U.S. government.
Some partners may fear that India will become more reluctant to cooperate with India lest it derail re-engagement with China. However, despite continuing negotiations with the Chinese government, New Delhi did not hesitate to take some steps, as it did before 2020. These include Prime Minister Modi’s response to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-de. India welcomed the US Congressional delegation that met with the Dalai Lama and criticized China. The Quad summit included harsher language regarding China’s assertiveness and security cooperation efforts in the South China Sea. Hosts Malabar naval exercise and multilateral air force exercise Taran Shakti. In addition to Australia’s Kakadu exercise, she participated in a maritime reconnaissance exercise with Quad partners. We also opened our third representative office in Taiwan in India.
This is because from 2020 onwards, there has been a shift from the view that deepening relations with the US and Western partners will stimulate China to a view that deepening relations with balancing partners will deter China. It might be the cause.
Nevertheless, it would not be surprising if partner countries continue to monitor India’s possible reluctance to cooperate against China in the future. It would be helpful if New Delhi could be as transparent as possible with its partners about its discussions with China and their impact, something partners should reciprocate regarding their own lobbying of Beijing. .